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CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS 
Connie Margaritis  
Abstract: Given the increased use of terrorist tactics in ethnic conflict and separatist movements over the 
past decade, an understanding of the causes of both ethnic conflict and separatism have become vital to the 
protection of innocent lives. This study focuses on ten republics in the Caucasus region, since it is a highly 
conflictual region in a small area, with both a strong Muslim and Orthodox Christian presence.  While some 
literature suggests that a high Muslim population or the presence of a jihadist movement causes extremely 
violent forms of separatism, other research indicates that in the Caucasus region, past grievances, a high 
percentage of the titular minority group, and external support contribute much more to both separatist 
movements and ethnic conflict.  
INTRODUCTION 
 For as long as humans have differentiated themselves into groups, conflict has arisen 
between them.  Some conflicts remain small and relatively easy to resolve through peaceful means; 
others quickly escalate into bloody clashes, both short and long-term.  Separatist movements and 
ethnic conflicts occur throughout the world, even in developed nations, with thirty-nine major 
genocides or politicides alone from 1955 to 2002.1Although instances of genocide and politicide are 
applicable to the study of ethnic violence, the primary focus here will be ethnic conflict in forms 
ranging from separatist feelings to outright terrorism.  What causes some ethno-national minority 
groups to engage in ethnic conflict and separatism, while others maintain relatively peaceful 
relationships with the state?   
The Caucasus region provides an excellent framework for the study of ethnic violence and 
separatism. Of the ten republics studied that were all  part of the Soviet Union until 1991, each has 
very little economic infrastructure and hardly any natural resources, and within each republic 
there is at least one ethnic group that identifies itself as something other than Russian or Georgian.  
Some of these ethnic republics have developed full ethnic wars, while others maintain peaceful 
relationships.  In addition, the Caucasus region has recently become a hotbed of Islamic 
movements, and its proximity to violent Muslim countries makes it a potentially dangerous region. 
This potentiality will become realized if steps are not taken to identify causes of ethnic conflict and 
separatism  as, well as rectify grievances, before they escalate further.  
 
Defining Ethnicity and Identity 
 For the purposes of this paper, ethnicity will be defined as “a group that defines itself or is 
defined by others as sharing common descent and culture.”2 More specifically, ethnic groups can 
                                                          
1 Barbara Harff, “Risk Assessment Model 2003: Genocide and Politicide.”  Arlington: George Mason 
University. 
2 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005): 3. 
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be defined by color, appearance, language, religion, or some other indicator of common 
origin3Whether a group sees itself as an ethnicity or the state ascribes certain characteristics to a 
group of people does not matter, as both cause separation between this group of people and the 
majority population of the state.  Hence, an ethnic minority is, “a group divided along either 
religious or ethnic lines”.4 Identity is a sense of common fate between groups of people, group 
judgments, and the capacity to distinguish between people who are like oneself, and those who are 
not, in group settings.5 6 Ethnic identity is an important concept for this study because “identity 
theories stress that shared identity defines and creates the perception of the interests over which 
ethnic conflicts are fought”.7  
Causes of Separatism and Ethnic Conflict 
 Although causes of separatism and ethnic conflict differ greatly between regions, the 
literature generally suggests certain staple causes.  Barbara Harff and Robert Gurr divide the 
theoretical approaches for minority mobilization towards ethnic conflict or separatism into three 
theories.  The first, primordialism, seeks to explain ethnic issues at the most basic level.  
Primordialists argue that “people’s ethnic and religious identities have deep social, historical, and 
genetic foundations,” and thus, “modernization is a threat to ethnic solidarities that prompts 
minorities to mobilize in defense of their culture and way of life”.8  The primordialist approach 
requires a certain amount of group self-identification in order to create these divisions between 
ethnic groups.  An alternative to this theory is the instrumentalist approach.  Instrumentalists see 
the main goals of a group as political and economic gains, and view the invocation of cultural 
identity merely as a means to an end? 9The third basic theoretical approach is that of the 
constructivists.  This approach “emphasizes the ways in which group identities emerge and 
change over time.”  Ethnic identities may not have been originally strong, but can be shaped and 
strengthened by outsiders, influenced by intellectuals within the group, or reinforced through 
conflict with other groups 10 
Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley categorize the psychological impetus for ethnic conflict 
into four categories: convenience, revenge, simple fear, and fear of pollution.11  Convenience 
consists of the government, or stronger group, recognizing that the easiest or cheapest solution to 
                                                          
3 Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Inquiry (Part I).” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (2001): 261. 
4 Harff, 59. 
5 Marc Howard Ross, “Psychocultural Interpretations and Dramas: Identity Dynamics in Ethnic Conflict.” 
Political Psychology 22 (March, 2001): 157-178. 
6 Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, Why Not Kill Them All?  The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder.  
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
7 Ross, 159. 
8 Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Second Edition.  (Colorado: Westview 
Press, 2004): 96. 
9 Gurr and Harff, 96. 
10 Ibid., 97. 
11 Chirot and McCauley, 20-39. 
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their problem with another group is ethnic violence or mass murder.  Revengeoffers an interesting 
explanation, because it relies heavily upon the idea of identity.  In the revenge theory, groups 
engage in ethnic conflict, and possibly separatism, with one another due to a perception of 
disgraced group honor or pride.  Ted Gurr describes this phenomenon accurately in the 
“Minorities at Risk” report, explaining, “When governments use repression to maintain ethnic 
stratification and to deter organized resistance, they sharpen people’s desires for redress and 
revenge”.12  Fear is another psychological trigger for ethnic conflict.  This cause relies on the idea, 
often propagated by elites, that a certain ethnic group could face extinction or severe opposition if 
they do not fight against the competing ethnic group (,).1314  Finally, fear of “pollution” often causes 
some of the harshest forms of ethnic conflict, including genocide.  Targeted ethnic groups are 
accused of “actively disrupting or polluting the state’s drive to transcend its limitations” (Levene, 
2000, 325).  This requires the group instigating ethnic conflict to create an ideology so that they can 
create a perfect regime, and focus on eliminating the targeted group. .15   
Once a group feels a need to avenge a grievance, it will weigh the costs and benefits of a 
separatist movement or conflict.  Donald Horowitz separates possible secessionist groups into four 
categories: backwards groups in backwards regions, advanced groups in backwards regions, 
advanced groups in advanced regions, and backwards groups in advanced regions .16  The 
Caucasus Republics certainly fall under Horowitz’s category of “backwards,” meaning they are 
behind the rest of the titular state in socio-economic measures.  Both “backwards” groups will 
often follow separatist movements even if there are high economic costs; however, both are much 
more likely to attempt a separatist movement if they have outside support.  Both also use 
grievances to truly mobilize an ethno-nationalist movement for separatism .17  
 In addition to the psychological forces behind ethnic conflict and separatism, certain 
economic and political preconditions greatly augment the possibility of such conflict within a 
region.  The five more or less universally agreed-upon characteristics that yield ethnic conflict are 
active ethnic discrimination, high ethnic diversity, a recent history of violent political upheaval, 
few memberships in regional organizations, and a high infant mortality rate .18  Infant mortality 
itself is not so much the important characteristic, as much as it identifies low economic levels and 
poor healthcare.  In cases of genocide, autocratic rule, low trade openness, and low religious 
                                                          
12 Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2000), 105. 
13 Ervin Staub, “Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing, and Reconciliation.”  Political 
Psychology 21 (June, 2000), 370. 
14 Chirot and McCauley, 32. 
15 Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 58. 
16 Donald Horowitz, “Patterns of Ethnic Separatism,” Comparitive Studies in Society and History 23, (April, 
1981): 192. 
17 Ibid., 192. 
18 Jack A. Goldstone, et al., “State Failure Task Force: Phase III Findings.” (Arlington, George Mason 
University, 2003): 35. 
 66 Res Publica 
 
diversity are often indicators.19  For predominantly Muslim states, the religious doctrine of jihad 
adds another element to potential ethnic conflict, because, “Some scholars and many Muslims have 
argued that, because they do not accept the dualistic distinction between sacred and profane 
modes of social behavior, Islamic societies and politics differ fundamentally from those of non-
Muslim cultures.  Among Muslims there is intense debate concerning the compatibility of Islam 
and democracy and the role of jihad .20  This theory begs the question: what can explain the 
presence of conflict in some parts of a predominantly Muslim and ethnically fragmented region 
and not others?  The Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union provides a natural experiment for 
looking at these issues. 
The Caucasus Region 
 The Republics in the Caucasus region are amongst the oldest civilizations, yet currently 
among the least developed of the post-Soviet bloc.  The Caucasus is located at the crossroads of 
Europe and Asia, tempting empires seeking to conquer it for centuries.  To the north lies the 
Russian steppe, the Persian hill country to the southeast, and the Turkish uplands to the 
southwest.21  Although the location provided significant exposure outside cultures, “The 
numerous Caucasian nations, of indigenous or Turkic origins, often inhabiting small mountainous 
territories, have historically maintained an inward-looking, xenophobic view of the outside 
world.”22  These nations originally specialized in horse breeding or agriculture, but constant 
invasions forced them to develop a war-like culture and further isolate themselves in the 
mountains.23  These tribal origins give way to the customary Caucasian law, mostly a combination 
of unwritten law and a community control system, infused with occasional Islamic Shari’a law.24  
Such a hybrid institution characterizes the overarching diversity within the Caucasus region, 
which makes it a fascinating, yet inherently problematic region. 
 The Caucasus region can be divided into the North Caucasus, located within the Russian 
state, and the South Caucasus, split between the current post-Soviet States of Georgia, Armenia, 
and Azerbaijan.  The North Caucasus republics are: Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-
Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, Adygea, and North Ossetia.  The South Caucasus republics are: 
South Ossetia, Ajaria, and Abkhazia.25  While each of these republics is home to a titular ethnic 
group or groups, each also hosts sizable minority populations, including ethnic Russians or 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 45. 
20 Ted Robert Gurr, Mark Woodward, and Monty G. Marshall, “Forecasting Instability: Are Ethnic Wars and 
Muslim Countries Different?” (Arlington: George Mason University, 2005): 7. 
21 Christoph Zurcher. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationahood in the Caucasus.  (New 
York: New York University Press, 2007), 13. 
22 James Minahan, The Former Soviet Union’s Diverse Peoples: A References Sourcebook. (Santa Barbara: ABC-
CLIO, 2009), 11. 
23 Ibid., 12. 
24 Moshe Gammer, Ethno-Nationalism, Islam, and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder. (New York: 
Routledge), 20. 
25 “Ethno-linguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region.” 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/ethnocaucasus.jpg. 
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Georgians in each, creating deep cleavages between groups.  The exception is Dagestan because, 
“the name Dagestani is actually a generic term used to designate any of dozens of Caucasian or 
Turkic ethnic groups living in the eastern part of the North Caucasus on the Caspian Sea.”26  On a 
recent survey about ethnic identity in the region, 75 percent of respondents chose “Dagestani” as 
their ethnicity, while only 10.5 percent who consider themselves members of traditional Dagestani 
tribes chose their own original ethnic group .27  The republics of the Caucasus region do, however, 
share a common daily life “A largely shared everyday culture unites the groups whose referent 
loyalty and identity was informed more by religion, locality, and kinship than by the concept of 
the nation.” 28   
Due to a lack of strong nationhood, religion has become a defining characteristic of many of 
the Caucasus groups. The Caucasus region historically served as the borderland between the 
Russian Orthodox to the north and the Islamic nations to the south.  Before Ottoman takeover of 
the Caucasus region and in order to secure frontiers and defeat mountain peoples, the czarist 
Imperial regime used local Christian peoples in the many battles against Ottoman Turkey and 
Shamil, whether through battle or attempts at religious conversion.29  These struggles between 
Islam and Christianity created an animosity that never quite faded from Caucasus culture.  
Unfortunately for the czars, “The invasion of the Muslim Arabs ended the historic rivalry for 
influence in the Caucasus region.  The Arabs occupied the region but allowed local nobles to rule 
so long as they paid the required taxes.”30  By the beginning of the seventeenth century, what are 
today the Caucasus Republics had been “Islamized,” with the exceptions of North and South 
Ossetia.  By granting locals authority, however, the Ottoman Turks subdued much of the 
animosity otherwise directed at an imperialistic power.31  By the nineteenth century, Russia had 
regained some of its control over the Caucasus, and Russian attitudes toward their newly 
reacquired Islamic republics can be exemplified by an 1865 deportation of 40,000 Chechens back to 
Ottoman territory in retaliation for a violent uprising.32  After the Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet 
policy tightened even further on religious life in the Caucasus with widespread execution of 
Caucasian religious leaders in 1920.33  Religious presence was largely suppressed until the fall of 
the Soviet Union. 
 From the late 1980s to present day, the Caucasus region has undergone a revival of Islam.  
The number of mosques provides a solid indication, as mosque construction was not permitted 
under the Soviets.  By 1999, 1,670 mosques had been constructed in Dagestan, 400 in Igushetia, 96 
                                                          
26 Minahan, 3000. 
27 Zurcher, 194. 
28 Ibid., 15. 
29 Austin Jersild, “Faith, Custom, and Ritual in the Borderlands: Orthodoxy, Islam, and the ‘Small Peoples’ of 
the Middle Volga and the North Caucasus.” Russian Review 59 (October, 2000): 514. 
30 Minahan, 7. 
31 Zurcher, 14. 
32 Minahan, 86. 
33 Ibid., 163. 
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in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 150 in Karachaevo-Cherkessia.34   During the 1990s, “the institutions 
and values of Islam regained quickly their former influence on the social and political life in the 
Northern Caucasus.”35  This manifestation of Islam in political life can be most poignantly seen in 
“Wahhabi” The quotes are necessary in this instance, Wahhabi is always in quotes in the reading 
because it is a controversial name resistance movements throughout the Caucasian republics.  
“Wahhabi” movements originated in Arab states as resistance against secular governments and 
have been adopted by separatists in the Caucasus, particularly the Chechens.  Recent examples of 
the epic levels of violence inspired by Chechen separatism and “Wahhabism” was the 2002 seizure 
of a Moscow theater, resulting in the deaths of more than 100 theatergoers, as well as the Beslan 
Massacre in September 2004, killing 400 people, mainly innocent parents and children.36  This 
resistance is no longer contained within Chechnya, but rather, “has spread by now to other 
republics in the Northern Caucasus and acts of terrorism, including suicide bombing by women, 
have been committed in Moscow, other Russian cities, and all over the Northern Caucasus.”37  
Guerillas fighters have learned to use the war vocabulary of Islamist fighters from Arab nations, 
and are spreading Islamic movements throughout the Caucasian region, specifically in 
predominantly Muslim republics.38  The Russian and Georgian governments have attempted to 
curb “Wahhabi” movements, but have met with extremely limited success.   
 Economically, the Caucasus region has become woefully underdeveloped after the fall of 
the Soviet Union.  Conditions have worsened recently, to the point where “Child mortality is three 
times higher than in Western Europe, and male life expectancy has dropped from 63.8 years in 
1990 to 59 years in 2000, and 55.5 years in 2002.”39 Unemployment was not originally a major 
problem after the fall of the Soviet Union, as “it was only with violent escalation of conflict that 
unemployment really became a mass phenomenon.”40  In Georgia, the 1995 national GDP was 17 
percent of its 1989 value, and almost one million workers had left by 2001, mostly university 
graduates.41  To further complicate matters, since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and Georgia 
have not followed similar policies, and have, in fact, often acted in contrast to one another, adding 
further instability to the region.  Gorbachev’s policy of encouraging nationalism created strong 
feelings among the Georgians for independent statehood. However, it also created problems 
within Georgia among the Ossetians and Abkhazians.42  More recently, in 2008, Russia withdrew 
troops from Georgia after its invasion, however stressed that its decision to recognize Abkhazia 
                                                          
34 Vladimir Bobrovnikov, “Al-Azhar and Shari’a Courts in Twentieth-Century Caucasus.” Middle Eastern 
Studies 37 (October, 2001): 5. 
35 Gammer, 23. 
36 Charles King, The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
239. 
37 Gammer, 187. 
38 King, 241. 
39 Leszek Buszunski, “Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States in 2002: Going Separate Ways.” 
Asian Survey 43 (Jan-Feb, 2003): 19. 
40 Zurcher, 47. 
41 Minahan, 266. 
42 Ibid., 245. 
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and South Ossetia’s independence was “irreversible.”43  Russia, however, firmly maintains that all 
republics under its control will remain under the control of the Russian state.  Conflicts occur 
across the border as well, when in the early 2000s, “over Ingush protests, North Ossetia has 
resettled South Ossetian refugees in the disputed district while denying Ingush petitions to return 
to their homes.44  These deep-rooted conflicts provide an excellent framework for a study of ethnic 
and religious conflict in a single region, and a discovery of contributing factors.                       
            
HYPOTHESES 
 The hypotheses will address ethnic conflict and separatism in conjunction with the theories 
on ethnic conflict.  Although some theories uniformly apply to all the republics within the 
Caucasus region, and thus do not provide interesting comparisons, several raise potential reasons 
for ethnic conflict and separatism.  The first hypothesis concerns Horowitz’s, as well as the 
Constructivist idea, that outside influence can shape an ethnic conflict or separatist movement: 
H1: Minority ethnic groups with financial, resource, or ideological support outside the state are 
more likely to engage in separatist movements and ethnic conflict than other groups attempting to 
achieve similar objectives. 
The second hypothesis articulates Chirot and McCauley’s and Horowitz’s views of 
impetuses for ethnic conflict and separatism: 
H2: An ethnic minority group that identifies itself as “historically oppressed” by the past colonial 
or ruling power is more likely to engage in violent forms of ethnic conflict or separatism 
  The third hypothesis is based on Harff and Gurr’s characteristics that yield ethnic conflict, 
and the diverse populations within the Caucasus region: 
H3: Republics with a majority percentage of one titular ethnic group different from the majority 
ethnic group within the State are more likely to maintain separatist movements or ethnic violence 
than more ethnically diverse Republics 
The final hypotheses concern Gurr’s work on Islamic movements and ethnic violence: 
 
H4: Republics with a majority Muslim population are more likely to engage in ethnic conflict and 
separatist movements than other Republics 
H5: The presence of a strong jihadist movement increases the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict or 
separatism compared to Republics where a jihadist movement is not present 
                                                          
43 Hooman Peimani, Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus, (Santa Barbara: ABC_CLIO, 2009): 
69. 
44 Minahan, 300. 
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OPERALIZATION AND METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
 This study follows a most-similar design due to the proximity of the Republics to each 
other, and similarities in the region.  These similarities cannot account for regional variations in the 
dependent variable and can therefore be controlled for, or eliminated as, causal agents.  One 
important similarity is the level of development, (or underdevelopment) in the region.  High 
fertility rates are generally associated with less modern and less developed societies, and not 
surprisingly, it is higher in the North Caucasus compared to the other Russian territories, at a 
relatively high 1.8 births per mother.45  Georgia’s overall birthrates are similarly high at 1.4, which 
is still higher than the more urbanized portions of Russia.46  A more common birthrate for Western 
Europe is indicated by Spain, at 1.3 births per mother.47  Infant mortality, another important 
economic indicator, is also high in the North Caucasus, at 26.53 per 1,000 births in Russia and 18.21 
deaths per 1,000 births in Georgia.48  The GDP per capita in the Caucasus is “barely half that of the 
average for the Federation, and productivity and wages are also low.”49.  The GDP per capita in 
Georgia is also dismally low, at $4,700 USD.50  These similarities can rule out economic indicators, 
often an early suspect, as a reason for separatist movements, and focus the study on potential 
differences between the Republics. 
Operationalization of the Dependent Variable 
 Separatism is the dependent variable in this study.  Ethnic conflict will be combined with 
separatism on a single scale, because in the Caucasus, the two go hand-in-hand.  There are 
spontaneous outbursts of disagreement between different ethnic groups occupying the same 
territory, but where ethnic groups have formed a sense of national identity they usually seek 
greater autonomy for their Republic within the majority state.  At the extreme end of this drive we 
see outright separatism, and violent demands for full independence, as the war in Chechnya so 
vividly demonstrated.  Separatism and ethnic conflict will be measured on a combined scale from 
1-4, with (1) meaning localized and sporadic conflict between ethnic groups within or across 
Republics, (2) meaning regular low-level conflict between groups within or across Republics, (3) 
meaning ethno-nationalism and demands for greater autonomy, and (4) meaning violent separatist 
demands, possibly also combined with acts of terrorism.  The cases included are the Republics of: 
Adygea, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, North 
Ossetia, Abkhazia, Ajaria, and South Ossetia.  This focuses on the North and South Caucasus 
                                                          
45 Ward Kingkade, Population Trends: Russia, (Washington D.C.: E.S. Department of Commerce, 1997), 2. 
46 The CIA World Factbook, Middle East: GeorgiaI, (Washington D.C.: ISSN 1553-8133, 2009). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Kingkade, CIA World Factbook. 
49 “Centre for the Study of Public Policy: North Caucasus.” http://www.abdn.ac.uk.cspp/North-Caucasus-
1.shtml.” 
50 CIA World Factbook. 
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region within Russia and Georgia, but excludes Armenia and Azerbaijan due to the long-standing 
interstate conflict over the Nagorno-Karabalch. 
Operationalization of Independent Variables 
    Concurrent with the theories that identity and past grievances create an atmosphere ripe 
for ethnic conflict, one independent variable will focus on the relationships of the Republics with 
the Soviet Union in the correlation.  However, another is worth mentioning as well.  The other 
independent variable focusing on the relationship with the Soviet Union is the occurrence of 
deportations.  Theorists purporting the “revenge” theory for ethnic violence assume that the 
deportations conducted by the Soviet Union on several ethnicities within the Caucasus republics 
provide a strong basis for revenge-based conflict.  Even today, for the Chechens, “The 
‘deportation’ remains the central building block of Chechen national identity.”51 Once again 
concurrent with the hypotheses, a code of “0” means that the primary ethnic group within the 
republic did not experience deportations while a code of “1” signifies a past including 
deportations.52  From this point on, citations are correct. Please adjust previous citation to make 
them also footnotes. The variable not included in the correlation assesses whether, during the rule 
of the Soviet Union, the republics were ASSRs or AOs.  ASSR republics had more autonomy than 
AO republics, including a greater number of Soviet university places set aside for their citizens, 
and a second-place hierarchy within the Soviet ethno federalist system, however they had no right 
of secession from the larger Union state they were a part of, in this case either the Soviet territory 
or the Georgian Union Republic.  AO republics had only a few privileges of cultural self-
administration, no universities within their republic and few Soviet university places, no media of 
their own, and no regional bureaucracy.53  Since the inclusion of AO/ASSR in coding does not 
provide enough variation, and thus is not included in the correlations, please see the appendix for 
more information.     
 The second focus of independent variables concerns the percentage of the population in 
each republic that considers itself part of the titular nationality of the republic.  These numbers are 
the only ones not coded from reading, but rather simply express the population percentage.54  The 
percentages range from as low as 17 percent in Abkhazia, all the way up to 73 percent in 
Chechnya, (possibly higher by some estimates).  Ethnic identity arises in the Chirot and McCauley 
theories as a strong impetus for seeking greater autonomy, and thus it is important to determine if 
the population percentage of the conflictual group creates likelihood for a separatist movement. 
 The third independent variable focuses on the proximity of the Republic to other Republics 
that are engaged in either conflict or separatism, in conjunction with Gurr and Harff’s theory that 
both Muslim and non-Muslim States, (in this case Republics) bordering areas with any type of 
                                                          
51
 Gammer, 106. 
52 Coding based on Zurcher, Christoph.  “The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood 
in the Caucasus.”  (New York: New York University Press), 2007.  
53
 Zurcher, 2007, 26-27. 
54 Zurcher, 2007. 
 72 Res Publica 
 
armed conflict are more likely to be engaged in conflict as well.55  This variable will be on a 3-point 
scale with (1) not bordering any conflicting Republics, (2) bordering Republics with either 
moderate ethnic conflict or separatist movements, or both, and (3) bordering a Republic that 
utilizes terrorist tactics.56  External Support is also an important variable, and often the key element 
to a group’s ability to even consider separatism.  This variable is coded on a 4-point scale with (0) 
being no external support, (1) is a diaspora offering cultural support, (2) indicating some help or 
even ideological recognition from outside states or groups, and (3) meaning intense military, 
monetary and ideological support from outside states or groups.57   
The final group of independent variables concerns the presence of Islamist movements and 
the Muslim religion in the Republic.  Gurr’s Phase III report indicates a theory of higher levels of 
conflict in Muslim states, so it stands to reason that this same principle could apply to Muslim 
republics.  The first independent variable concerns whether the republic has a majority or minority 
Muslim population.  This is coded as a simple dichotomous variable with 0 indicating that the 
republic is not majority Muslim, and 1 indicating that it is.58  Enough variation exists with three 
republics that are not majority Muslim to make this a potentially meaningful variable.  The second 
variable indicates the strength of political Islam within the Republic.  Interestingly, even Republics 
without a majority Muslim population still have moderately active Islamist movements.  This 
variable is coded on a 1-3 scale, with (1) meaning “little to no Islamist movement,” (2) meaning 
“moderately active Islamist movement, and (3) meaning “very active Islamist movement or 
Wahhabi movement.”59  Wahhabi movements only occur with exceptionally strong Islamist 
movements, they are only included at the third level of the scale.    
ANALYSIS 
 With an N of only 10 cases, multivariate analyses are not possible, but bivariate correlations 
should offer important measures of association between each independent variable and the 
dependent variable.  The table below shows the variables correlated with the scale for separatism, 
and provides both the Pearson’s Correlation and the Significance.  Significant correlations are in 
bold: 
                                                          
55 http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/ethnocaucasus.jpg 
56 While the code “2” in this case encompasses a broad range, the distinction between terrorism and more 
traditional armed conflict is the main focus of the variable, and so all forms of tradition armed conflict are 
grouped together 
57 Thomas, 2006. RadioFreeEurope, 2009.  Ware and Kisriev, 2001.  Klimenko, Bowers, and Soloyeva, 2009. 
58 Demographic figures vary widely for the percent of a Muslim population in each Republic, so for accuracy, 
a simple majority as a dichotomous variable is being used. 
59 Coding decisions based on expert analyses found in: Minahan, James.  “The Former Soviet Union’s Diverse 
Peoples: A References Sourcebook.”  (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO), 2004.  Gammer, Moshe.  “Ethno-
Nationalism, Islam, and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder.”  (New York: Routledge), 2008. 
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TABLE 1 
 Separatism60 
Independent Variable Pearson Correlation Significance 
Percent Ethnic (N=9) 
 
.748** .010 
Deportations (N=10) .612** .030 
Majority Muslim (N=10) .327 .178 
Islamist Movement (N=10) .200 .289 
External Support (N=10) .872*** .001 
Borders Conflict (N=10) .423 .112 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) 
 
These correlations are particularly interesting because they show a relationship in the 
opposite directions from what would be expected from both hypotheses concerning Republics 
with majority Muslim populations and the presence of a jihadist movement.  In the Caucasus 
region, it appears that predominantly Orthodox republics are just as likely to engage in separatist 
movements, and that a jihadist movement does not necessarily guarantee conflict or separatism.  A 
high percentage of the titular population does, however, provide an impetus for separatism, as 
does a history of grievances, demonstrated by the deportations variable.  Areas that border conflict 
only have a slightly higher significant chance of having separatist movements, demonstrating 
further that Republics weigh the costs of a secession movement instead of just reacting to 
surrounding conflict.  Finally, external support provides the greatest correlation, which logically 
follows as a group with outside support will be more financially , ideologically, and militarily 
capable of launching a separatist movement. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60 Due to extremely disputed population demographics and charges of ethnic cleansing against the Georgian 
state by the Abkhazian people, Abkhazia’s population will not be included in the correlation. 
 74 Res Publica 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The most interesting part of the study was how firmly the Pearson’s Correlations opposed 
the theories that Muslim Republics would be more prone to violence.  This view has become 
especially common since terrorism became a prevalent world issue after the 9/11 attacks, however 
a Muslim population, or even a jihadist movement do not guarantee conflict and violence.  External 
support for separatism provides much more support, whether that support is from Islamic nations 
to Chechnya, or the Orthodox Russians to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Proximity to violence 
continues to pose a problem, as it does around the world, and Caucasus Republics are just as 
susceptible to their neighbors’ problems as anyone else.   
 These findings indicate that the cost-benefit analysis of conflict heavily influences a group’s 
decision to follow a separatist movement.  Furthermore, these findings slightly change Horowitz’s 
theory that less advanced groups care more about the perceived benefits of secession that the cost 
of seceding.  While past grievances contribute greatly to separatist movements, external support 
also plays an equally important role.  The perceived benefit of secession can push a group toward a 
separatist movement, but a minimized cost from outside support creates a much stronger 
foundation for separatism. 
 This study could be better modified with more exact demographic data, however currently 
those data are unavailable in English.61  A closer look at past grievances could help as well, because 
upon reflection, it would have proved useful to incorporate several potential grievances to gain a 
better picture.  This information, however, was once again unavailable.  Another interesting facet 
would be to include the Armenian and Azeri Republics, however within the constraints of this 
study, that was not a possibility. 
 Overall, this study attempted to explain separatist movements and ethnic conflict in one of 
the most diverse areas of the world.  The Caucasus are bordering on political upheaval and 
potentially becoming a hotbed for terrorism.  It would be in the best interest of Russia, Georgia, or 
even an international body to pacify the region now, and address the grievances of the Republics, 
before the area becomes an international problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 Demographic information is often highly skewed by the State (Russia or Georgia), and thus most 
demographic information, unless obtained first-hand, is not suitable for a study (Hewitt, 1995). 
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APPENDIX A 
Cases ASSR/AO 
Adygea AO 
Chechnya ASSR 
Dagestan ASSR 
Ingushetia ASSR 
Kabardino-Balkaria ASSR 
Karachai-Cherkessia AO 
North Ossetia ASSR 
Abkhazia ASSR 
Ajaria ASSR 
South Ossetia AO 
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 GENDER AS DIMENSION OF VOTING IN THE U.S. HOUSE  
Samantha Kaplan 
 
Abstract: This research examines whether or not electing women to the House of Representatives produces 
substantive representation for women in Congress.  The analysis is based on members’ voting records on 
gender-related legislation.  I controlled for the gender, seniority, and ideology of members of the House.  
Ideology was the only significant predictor in the model.  These results imply that gender is not a driving 
force behind voting for female members.  It is possible that ideology drowns out other predictive variables in 
the model.  Further research should include a longitudinal study of the House for multiple sessions of 
Congress, not just the 110th Congress.  A study that incorporates more votes and shows a pattern over time 
will be a better assessment of whether or not gender affects voting. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Women are substantially underrepresented in Congress.  Females make up only 16 percent 
of the U.S. House of Representatives in the 110th Congress, but about 51 percent of the total 
population.1  If members do vote based on their constituency’s needs, then it should not matter 
what characteristics a member of Congress possesses.  But, since many of the votes in Congress are 
not on high salience issues, members can get away with voting based on other factors besides 
constituency opinion and needs, such as gender or overall personal political ideology.  This paper 
seeks to answer the following question:  Do female representatives in the House vote differently 
than their male colleagues on gender-related issues?  Whether or not women vote differently than 
men is important because it is an indication of whether or not female representatives substantively 
represent the female constituency.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The question of whether or not electing more female members to the House of 
Representatives will create a more substantively representative House for women has become 
more prevalent since the drastic increase in female representatives in Congress over the last 
seventeen years.  Most literature revealed that being female does in fact impact voting in the 
House, even after variables such as personal traits, constituency characteristics, ideology, party, 
freshman status, leadership positions, and other factors are taken into account.2  The few pieces of 
literature that claim that gender is not an indication of substantive representation for women are 
mostly generalized from case studies.3 
Research from the 1980s suggests that females’ voting patterns were not significantly 
different from male members of Congress.  Other factors, such as party, constituency 
characteristics, and ideology, accounted for voting behavior, even on gender-related bills.  Even 
though there was not sufficient evidence from the small sample examined in the 1980s to conclude 
                                                          
1 CQ’s Politics in America 2008: The 110th Congress (District of Columbia: Congressional Quarterly, 2007).  
2 Noelle Norton, "Uncovering the Dimensionality of Gender Voting in Congress," Legislative Studies Quarterly 
24, no. 1 (1999): 65-86.; Michele Swers, "Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women’s Issue Bills than Their 
Male Colleagues," Legislative Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1998): 435-448.; Michele Swers, The Difference Women 
Make (Chicago: University of Chicago , 2002).  
3 Leora Tanenbaum, "Model Minority," Women's Review of Books, (1997): 7-10. 
